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FACTS
Plaintiffs (the "Black Smokers")' brought this class action suit on behalf
of all African-Americans who had purchased or consumed mentholated
tobacco products since 1954.2 The Black Smokers sued various tobacco
companies, claiming that these companies discriminated against the African-
American public by targeting them with advertisements for mentholated
tobacco products? The Black Smokers claim that the tobacco companies
knowingly harmed the African-American community by deceiving them into
believing that menthol cigarettes are healthier than non-mentholated
cigarettes.4 Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended, and the defendants did not
dispute, that mentholated tobacco products actually do pose a greater health
risk than non-mentholated products.5 The Black Smokers maintained that the
target advertising caused harmful disparities in the smoking population.6
According to the Black Smokers, African-Americans, who make up 10.3 % of
the U.S. population, constitute 31 %7 of all mentholated tobacco users.8 The
Black Smokers also stated that the tobacco companies did not advertise these
same messages to white consumers.9 Based on the above facts, the plaintiffs
sued the defendant tobacco companies in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on October 19, 1998.10
The Black Smokers based their claims on several theories of law. 1 First,
they claimed that defendants violated the civil rights statutes codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985(3) by infringing on African-Americans' right
to contract for and to purchase and hold, personal property on the same
grounds as "white" Americans. 2  Second, they argued that the tobacco
companies targeted African-Americans with defective products and that
defendants' advertisements constituted express warranties containing false and
1. "Black Smokers" is a term used by plaintiffs to describe themselves. The court adopts it in its
opinion.
2. Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 793 (3rd Cir. 2001).
3. Brown, 250 F.3d at 793.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 794.
6. Id. at 795.
7. Id. at 794. While Black Smokers cited reports placing the percentage of African-American
menthol smokers at 31%, 61.5% and 66%, the court relied on the 31% figure. It is unclear whether Black
Smokers conceded to the 31% figure or whether the court chose the figure without stating why it did so.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 795.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 797-799.
12. Id.
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misleading statements. 3 Third, Black Smokers claimed that the defendants are
federal actors, who violated a constitutional right under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 4 and that the defendants' target advertising violated
the Fifth Amendment. 5 Fourth and finally, the Black Smokers claimed the
tobacco companies are state actors, who violated the full and equal benefit
clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment.1
6
The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 7 Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. 8
HOLDING
A. First, the court held that in order to bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, or 1985(3), claiming that the defendant engaged in
discriminatory target advertising, a plaintiff must demonstrate a disparity
between products the defendant sold to plaintiff's racial group and products
the defendant sold to others. 9 B. Second, the court held that the defendants
cannot be sued for false or misleading advertising because the Federal
Cigarette Labeling Acts2" preempt such claims.2' C. Third, the court held that
the defendants cannot be sued for target advertising under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents22 or the Fifth Amendment because they
are not federal actors.23 D. Fourth, the court held that the defendants cannot
be sued for target advertising under the full and equal benefit clause, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, or the Fourteenth Amendment because they are not state actors.2
13. Id.
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens Claim (the federal version of a § 1983 claim) states that the
defendant violated the plaintiff's rights under color of federal law. Brown, 250 F.3d at 800 (citing
Alexander v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Banking, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5183, No. Civ. 93-5510, 1994 WL
144305, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 21, 1994)).
15. Brown, 250 F.3d at 800.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 795-96.
18. Id. at 789.
19. Id. at 794 and 805-806.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and its
successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 set out the advertising and labeling regulations
that Tobacco Companies must follow.
21. Brown, 250 F.3d at 798 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992).
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. Brown, 250 F.3d at 794.
24. Id. at 806.
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ANALYSIS
A. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985(3) Claims
1. §§ 1981, 1982 Claims
The Black Smokers claimed that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982 by infringing on the right of African-Americans to contract for,
purchase, and hold personal property on the same grounds as "white"
Americans.25 To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts that
support: "(1) [that plaintiff] is a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to
discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination
concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute[,] which
includes the right to enforce contracts." '26 To state a claim under § 1982, a
plaintiff must allege facts that support: "(1) the defendant's racial animus; (2)
intentional discrimination; and (3) that the defendant deprived plaintiff of his
rights because of race."27 The court concluded that the Black Smokers failed
to meet these tests because their claim, that the tobacco companies' target
advertising restricted their right to contract for and own non-mentholated
cigarettes, had no authoritative backing.2
Plaintiffs' case relied heavily on Roper v. Edwards,29 which suggests that
a cause of action exists when a defendant intentionally markets a defective
product to a person on the basis of race. The court distinguished the Black
Smokers' case, explaining that in Roper, the defendant sold the defective
product to African-Americans only, and that tobacco companies sell the same
mentholated tobacco products to all customers, regardless of race.3' The court
declared that if a situation arose where defendants sold virtually all
mentholated cigarettes to African-Americans and all non-mentholated
25. Id. at 797-799.
26. Id. at 797 (quoting Yelverton v. Lehman, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7651, No. Civ. A. 94-6114,
1996 WL 2965551, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1996), aff'dmem., 175 F.3d 1012 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
27. Id. at 797 (quoting Garg v. Albany Indus. Dev. Agency, 899 F. Supp. 961,968 (N.D.N.Y. 1995),
aftd, 104 F.3d 351 (Table), 1996 WL 547184 (2nd Cir. 1996)).
28. Id. at 798.
29. 815 F.2d 1474 (1lth Cir. 1987) (allowing cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when
defendant engages in racially discriminatory target advertising to sell defective products.) In Roper the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a cause of action existed where the defendant burial vault manufacturer
made targeted sales of defective burial vaults to black customers. The plaintiff, a white customer, to whom
the defendant inadvertently sold a defective burial vault brought suit. Although the Eleventh Circuit
eventually rejected the plaintiffs' claims on other grounds, they did suggest that a cause of action under §
1981 would have existed were the plaintiff black.
30. Brown, 250 F.3d at 798.
31. Id.
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cigarettes to others, the facts might come within the scope of Roper.32 In a
similar vein, the Black Smokers compared their case to segregated housing
cases, such as Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 3 that allow a cause of action
when defendants steer minority groups into segregated housing. 4 The court
rejected this argument as well, citing the lack of a segregated market.35
Furthermore, Black Smokers failed to raise this claim at the District Court
level and therefore, the court rejected the claim on procedural grounds.36
The court summarized Black Smokers' failure to state a claim under §§
1981 and 1982 by asserting that their claims essentially constituted
discriminatory advertising claims. 37  The court found that case law
demonstrates that such claims are not actionable under §§ 1981 and 1982 of
the civil rights statutes because discriminatory advertising is unlikely to violate
a protected right.3
2. § 1985(3) Claim
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, through their concerted
advertising operations, breached 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by conspiring to violate
federal rights and privileges. 39 Under this statute a plaintiff must show: "(a)
that a racial or other class-based invidious discriminatory animus lay behind
the coconspirators' actions, (b) that the coconspirators intended to deprive the
victim of a right guaranteed by the Constitution against private impairment,
and (c) that that right was consciously targeted and not just incidentally
affected. 4 °  The court upheld the District Court's ruling that the Black
Smokers failed to meet requirement (b). Black Smokers further alleged that
32. Id.
33. 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973).




38. Id. at 799-800.
39. Id. at 805-06.
40. Id. at 805 (quoting Spencer v. Casavilla 44 F.3d 74, 77 (2nd Cir. 1994) (citations omitted)).
41. Id.. Requirement (b) demands a Constitutionally protected fight and Black smokers alleged the
right to be free from discrimination by a private actor, which is a statutorily protected right.
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a § 1985(3) claim can be supported by their §§ 1981 and 1982 claims, but the
court rejected this argument for lack of support in case law42 and because
Black Smokers failed to state a claim under §§ 1981 or 1982. 43
B. Misrepresentation/False Advertising Claim
The Black Smokers also claimed that the defendants' advertisements
constituted express warranties that contained false and misleading statements.
44
The court dismissed this argument stating that the Labeling Acts preempted
such claims because they rely on omissions in the manufacturer's
advertising.45
C. Federal Action Doctrine
The Black Smokers brought claims under Bivens and the Fifth
Amendment, which require that defendants be federal actors.46 The court
rejected these claims because the defendants could not be regarded as federal
actors.47
To determine whether the defendants were federal actors the court applied
the "state action" test.48 The first prong of the test asks whether the alleged
constitutional violation arose from a right or privilege having its source in
federal authority.49 The court found that the Black Smokers failed to satisfy
the first prong because the Black Smokers' claims failed to allege that the
defendants deprived them of a Constitutionally protected right.5 ° Furthermore,
the court said that the tobacco companies' activities cannot be said to be
approved by the government merely because they complied with the Federal
Labeling Act;5 ' the act of complying with federal law cannot be the basis for
42. Id.at 806, (citing Sanders v. Prentice-Hall Corp., 178 F.3d 1296 (Table) (6th Cir. 1999); Libertad
v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 447 n.15 (1st Cir. 1995); Tilton v. Richardson 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993).
43. Id. at 806.
44. Id. at 798.
45. Id. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and its successor, the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 set out the advertising and labeling regulations that Tobacco
Companies must follow. Id. at 796 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq). These acts preempt state law damages
actions in cases of failure to warn when such claims rely on omissions or inclusions in a manufacturer's
advertising. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 511 (1992)).
46. Id. at 800.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 801. The court used the two prong test originating from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. Inc,
457 U.S. 922 ,937-42 (1982) and summarized in Edmionson v. Leesville Concrete Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 620
(1991).
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transforming a party into a federal actor.5
2
The second prong of the "state action" test consists of three theories under
which a private party can be fairly described as a federal actor: (i) the public
function test; (ii) the close nexus test; and (iii) the symbiotic relationship test.53
The public function test asks whether the government is "using the private
entity to avoid a constitutional obligation or to engage in activities reserved to
the government." 4 The court asserted that the sale of a legal product, even if
governmentally regulated, is a private function, and not within the sweep of
the public function test.5 Thus the defendants were not engaged in a public
function and were not federal actors under the test.
The close nexus test requires that a private party, in relation with the
federal government, deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.56 The Black
Smokers contended that they met this test because the Labeling Act
encourages the tobacco companies to conceal the dangers of mentholated
products, mandates inadequate warnings and preempts most tort actions
against such companies.5 The court concluded that the Labeling Act does not
encourage such action, but only sets out a minimum requirement of disclosure
of the risks associated with using tobacco products.58 Additionally, the Black
Smokers did not allege the violation of a federal right, which is required under
the close nexus test.59
The court also rejected the Black Smokers' argument under the symbiotic
relationship test. 60 The Black Smokers contended that the huge amount of
revenue created by the tax on tobacco products creates a symbiotic relationship
between the federal government and the cigarette companies. 6' The court
rejected this argument because virtually all enterprises are subject to taxation
in varying degrees, and therefore under plaintiffs' analysis, almost any
business would meet the classification requirements of a federal actor.6"
Alternatively, the Black Smokers argued that they met a "totality of the
circumstances" test that takes an expansive view of the facts at hand in
determining whether the defendant is a federal actor.63 The Black Smokers
52. Id.
53. Id.




58. Id.(citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999); Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
59. Id. at 803 (citing Goussis, 813 F. Supp. at 357).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp. 918 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2nd Cir. 1990)).
63. Id. at 803-804.
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alleged that the Labeling Acts' preemption of claims makes it so involved with
the claims as to make the government's actions inseparable from the actions
of the cigarette companies.' The court questioned the validity of the "totality
of the circumstances" test, but refused this argument regardless, claiming that
preemptive provisions are common in federal product safety and information
disclosure legislation, and that marketing and advertising are classic private
functions.65
D. State Action Doctrine
The Black Smokers claimed on appeal that defendants are state actors who
violated the full and equal benefit clause," § 1983,67 and the Fourteenth
Amendment.68 While the court dismissed these claims because the plaintiffs
failed to raise them at the district court level, it also rejected them on the
grounds that the defendants could not be regarded as state actors. 69 The court
reasoned that the defendants were not state actors for essentially the same
reasons they were not federal actors.7"
DISSENT
The dissent would not have rejected the Black Smokers' claims under §§
1981, 1982, and 1985(3)."' Judge Shadur argued that §§ 1981 and 1982 are
not limited by their terms to claims of outright deprivation of the right to
contract.72 He portrayed the statutes as mandating an "equal playing field" that
should not be disturbed by racially discriminatory conditions.73  Under this
analysis, he argued that the Black Smokers' claim (that target advertising
64. Id. at 804.
65. Id at 804. (citing Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. 1261 et seq., note (b)(1)(A);
Moss v. Parks Corp. 985 F.2d 736, 739-41 (4th Cir. 1993) (construing preemption provision of Federal
Hazardous Substances Act)).
66. Id. at 799 A full and equal benefit claim states that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of the
full and equal benefit of the law as it is enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a) The Black Smokers
argued that the defendants' target advertising violated the clause. Id.
67. Id. at 800. § 1983 provides a cause of action when a state actor deprives any person of a
protected right under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
68. Brown, 250 F.3d at 800. When the Black Smokers originally brought their Fourteenth
Amendment claim in Federal District Court they were only claiming that the defendants were federal actors.
Id. at 800. A Fourteenth Amendment claim requires the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants are state
actors. Id. at 800. Since the Black Smokers did not contend that the defendants were state actors until the
appellate level, the court upheld the lower court's dismissal. Id.
69. Id. at 799-800.
70. Id. at 799.
71. Id. at 806.
72. Id. at 807.
73. Id.
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impacted the African-American community to such an extent that their ability
to contract for cigarettes is no longer equal with "white" smokers) is actionable
under §§ 1981 and 1982."4 Shadur pointed to the majority's statistics, which
demonstrate that African-Americans constitute 10% of the nations's
population and 31% of the menthol tobacco users, prove that the target
advertising has had a substantial effect on the African-American community's
right to contract for and own non-mentholated cigarettes.75 Using these
figures, the odds that the above distribution happened by chance are 1.28 in a
trillion.76 Shadur argued that this data undermines the court's attempt to
distinguish Black Smokers' claims from Roper and Clark by using a
segregated market analysis." He concluded that such a large disparity is so
likely to be the product of steering, that Black Smokers should have their day
in court.78
Shadur also pointed out that the tobacco companies' claims that African-
Americans were already predisposed to menthol cigarettes before the
companies began their target advertising is an issue to be decided at trial.79
Additionally, Judge Shadur commented that the proper standard of review for
discrimination cases is whether the court can reasonably infer intent from
disparate impact, and that the issue of intent should be resolved by a jury."0
Justice Shadur concluded by scolding the majority; noting that all claims
deserve proper attention even if they appear to be out of the ordinary or
unlikely to be true.8"
CONCLUSION
While claims of racial steering are unquestionably valid under the Fair
Housing Act, 2 it is unclear whether such claims are cognizable under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 or outside of the real estate arena. 3 Without
legislation granting smokers a clear cause of action for discriminatory
advertising under §§ 1981 or 1982, the Supreme Court may decline to extend
74. Id. at 807-08.
75. Id. at 808.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 809.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 810.
81. Id. at 811.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(c).
83. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc.,
899 F.2d 24, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Saunders v. General Services Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1062 (E.D. Va.
1987); Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assocs., 714 F. Supp. 709, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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the statutes to such claims. Ironically, the current legislation regulating
tobacco companies works to shield the companies from claims such as
plaintiffs' because the Labeling Acts only require one warning for all types of
cigarettes.84 Thus, smokers cannot sue the tobacco companies for failing to
warn them that one type of cigarette is more harmful than others.
Another hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to sue on discriminatory advertising
claims is that the Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that § 1982 does not
prohibit "advertising or other representation that indicate discriminatory
preferences. 85 Numerous district courts and the D.C. Circuit have taken this
statement to mean that discriminatory advertising in the housing arena is never
a cause of action under §§ 1981 or 1982 without evidence of some other type
of discrimination. 6 Furthermore, courts' lack of concern for discriminatory
advertising outside of the housing arena may stem from the policy behind the
Fair Housing Act. One of the driving reasons behind prohibiting racial
steering in the housing arena is to make sure that minorities are able to reap the
social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.8 7 It is
difficult to see how the type of cigarettes a person smokes could substantively
affect their ability to interact with others in society. Thus, the reasoning for
allowing racial steering actions in the housing market does not easily carry
over to the tobacco market.
On the other hand, racial steering in the tobacco markets causes a different
type of damage; greater health risks to African-Americans. 88 Moreover, one
could argue that the case law requiring discriminatory advertising claims to
include a showing of a segregated market under §§ 1981 and 1982 is limited
to suits involving housing discrimination and not applicable to other areas of
discriminatory advertising. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that §
1982 is to be interpreted broadly by the courts.8 9 The Brown Court, perhaps
wary of these countervailing factors, sent a mixed signal. The court concluded
that Black Smokers would have a § 1981 claim under Clark and Roper if they
could demonstrate the existence of a racially segregated market90 but at the
same time stated that claims of discriminatory advertising are not actionable
under §§ 1981 or 1982."'
Assuming that the Brown court is correct in stating that §§ 1981 and 1982
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1331, etseq.
85. Jones,392 U.S. at 413.
86. Spann, 899 F.2d at 35; Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1062; Ragin, 714 F. Supp. at 713.
87. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111, 115, n. 30 (1979).
88. Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 794 (3rd Cir. 2001).
89. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437.
90. Brown, 250 F.3d at 798.
91. Id. at 799-800.
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could generate a discriminatory advertising claim, the Black Smokers have an
arguable case even if they cannot show a segregated market. This is because
the Brown court's contention that Clark92 and Roper demand a segregated
market to sustain a racial steering claim is too sweeping.93 While Clark held
that the plaintiff had a prima facie case because he alleged the existence of
dual housing markets, it never held that a dual market was essential to
establishing a prima facie case.9' In fact, the Clark court stressed a broad
reading of § 1982 that should not be limited to prohibiting traditional forms of
discrimination.95 Thus, the Clark holding seems to suggest that Black
Smokers claims could be actionable, even without a showing of a entirely
segregated market.
The Brown court's reading of Roper is equally problematic because the
court interprets it to require a completely segregated market as well. 96 There
are two important problems with this reading of Roper. First, the Roper court
never mentions or suggests a requirement for a segregated market.97 Second,
Roper did not involve a completely segregated market.9 The plaintiff in
Roper was a "white" man to whom the defendant inadvertently sold a
defective burial vault marked for African-American customers.99 Thus, a more
accurate reading of Roper would be that as long as defendant's sale of
defective products to "white" customers is an inadvertent side-effect of
targeting African-Americans, the plaintiff has a cause of action under Roper.
The Black Smokers claim that defendants only aimed the harmful advertising
at African-Americans (making white menthol smokers an inadvertent side
effect of the target advertising) is, therefore, arguably within the sweep of
Roper.
The largest difference between Roper/Clark type cases and the Black
Smokers' claim is the sale structure. In Roper and Clark the advertiser and the
sales person were closely linked. Therefore the chance of inadvertent sales to
white customers was low. Cigarette sales, on the other hand, are different.
The advertiser and the sales person are only loosely connected. This may be
part of the reason for the larger frequency of mentholated cigarette sales to
white customers. In all cases, regardless of inadvertent sales, the alleged intent
of the advertiser remains the same.
92. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc, 501 F.2d 324, 328 (7th Cir. 1973).
93. Brown, 250 F.3d at 798-99.
94. Clark, 501 F.2d at 328.
95. Id. at 330.
96. Brown, 250 F.3d at 798.
97. Roper v. Edwards, 815 F.2d 1474 (11 th Cir. 1987).
98. Roper, 815 F.2d at 1476.
99. Id.
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An interesting yet troubling aspect of the Brown court's holding is that it's
outcome is rather ironic when viewed in relation to other cases in the area of
racial discrimination. Intent is often the most difficult aspect of a
discrimination case to prove because of the veiled nature of racial
discrimination. The Supreme Court has held that a showing of discriminatory
impact, by itself, is not sufficient to create an inference of the defendant's
intent to discriminate. I"' In the Black Smokers case, however, the defendant
conceded to intentional target advertising, and the court refused the
discrimination claim because the Black Smokers failed to prove a substantial
disparate impact.'0 ' After decades of the courts telling African-Americans,
who can show discriminatory impact, that they do not have a case because
they cannot prove intent, when a plaintiff finally has a clear case of intent, the
court responds by stating that they need to show a greater impact to establish
the violation of a protected right.
In summary, the law on whether §§ 1981 and 1982 will sustain non-
housing related, discriminatory advertising claims is unclear but leans in the
direction of disallowing such claims. These claims are difficult because they
do not involve the ususal case of direct refusal to sell to a protected class.
Should courts hold companies liable for encouraging the sale of their product
in a way that is most profitable for the company? Should cowboy's be able to
sue as a class because the tobacco companies target them with filterless and
non-light cigarettes? On the other hand, it is troubling that the tobacco
companies target mentholated products toward African-Americans. Racial
targeting is especially suspect. Furthermore, unlike filterless and other highly
concentrated cigarettes, mentholated cigarettes do not have blatantly obvious
increased health risks. The Labeling Acts compound the problem by allowing
tobacco companies to hide which products are the most harmful, thereby
keeping smokers from making informed choices. It is understandable that
many African-Americans feel that they have been wrongfully targeted,
deceived and harmed, especially considering the tobacco companies' past
history involving the enslavement of and discrimination against African
Americans. Clearly, the Brown Court faced a difficult decision. The court's
holding, although ultimately rejecting Black Smokers' particular claims, sends
a mixed signal as to whether such claims could ever be actionable.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Jacob T. Penrod
100. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
101. Brown, 250 F.3d at 794, 798.
2002]

